We play the ultimatum game with a sample of 1650 blacks and whites drawn from the universe of registered voters in three states and merged with information on neighborhood income and racial composition. We vary both the stakes and offer size to identify racial differences in inequality aversion. We also experimentally vary the implied race of the ultimatum game proposer to examine racial differences in behavior in the presence of black versus white proposers. We find no overall racial differences in acceptance rates or inequality aversion. However, we find racial differences in ultimatum game behavior on other dimensions. Blacks are more likely to accept higher nominal offers, conditional on the share the offer represents, and they increase their acceptance of higher offered shares faster when faced with same-race proposers. Some of these differences are driven by black-white differences in the lowest income group in our sample, which represents the 10 th percentile of the black income distribution. We find little evidence of racial differences in behavior at the 50 th and 90 th percentiles of the black income distribution.
Introduction
Black-white disparities take almost every imaginable form. These include -but likely are not limited to -differences in health outcomes, even at birth; educational attainment; earnings; employment rates; poverty rates; political representation and participation; and rates of criminal activity and incarceration.
1 As is the case with gender, racial disparities are so widespread, so large, and so resistant to policy interventions intended to narrow them that it seems possible that they may be driven in part by underlying group differences in preferences. As is also the case with gender, the fact that such differences may well be culturally determined does not lessen their potential for explaining disparities. However, in contrast to gender, little is known about racial differences in economic behavior in experimental settings that can be linked to underlying preferences.
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In this paper, we report the results of an experiment in which we use the classic setting of the ultimatum game (UG) to test for racial differences in economic behavior, namely aversion to inequality. The ultimatum game is an ideal setting for our purposes because UG behavior is widely considered to be related to preferences for fairness. In a one-shot UG, player one (the "proposer")
is invited to divide a sum of money with player two. If player two (the "responder") accepts the proposed division, the money is divided accordingly; otherwise, neither receives a payment (Guth 1982) . Because receiving any amount leaves player two better off than the status quo, she should accept any non-zero offer. Knowing this, player one maximizes her return by offering the minimum allowed share. Contrary to these expectations, offers are usually between 40 and 50% of the stakes, and on average 16% of non-zero offers are rejected, typically when they fall below 20% of the total 1 See: Chay, Guryan, and Mazumder, 2009 (health outcomes); Hanushek, Neal, and Welch, 2006 (educational attainment) ; Charles and Guryan, 2008 (earnings) ; Griffin and Newman, 2008 (political representation) and Verba, Schlozman, and Nie, 1995 (political participation); Freeman (1996) , Lochner and Moretti (2004) (rates of criminal activity and incarceration). The employment to population ratio in 2009 was 60.3 for whites and 53.2 for blacks (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). Poverty rates were 11.2% for whites and 24.7% for blacks in 2008 (U.S. Census Bureau). 2 Examples from the literature on gender differences in experimental settings: Eckel and Grossman 1998; Solnick 2001; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007 . However, the only racial comparison of UG behavior we have been able to locate is ancillary to what is otherwise a comparison of gender and UG play (Eckel and Grossman 2001). sum. 3 Rejections of non-zero offers are thought to stem from preferences related to fairness, either from a preference for equal splits (inequality aversion) or from a preference for punishing proposers who act selfishly (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2003) .
Studying racial differences in UG behavior is important for several reasons. First, there are a priori reasons to believe that blacks and whites will behave differently in the bargaining environment of the UG. Not least of these is the possibility that African Americans will be more sensitive to the possibility of exploitation, based on the group's historical and ongoing experience with discrimination (Emprical cites). There is also evidence that the racial composition of bargaining pairs affects bargaining behavior (Ayers and Siegelman 1995) . Second, because of its connections to fairness, UG behavior potentially reflects preferences that dictate how individuals respond in real world settings where fairness is a consideration, such as bargaining in the labor market and expressing political preferences for redistribution (Fong and Luttmer, 2009; Babcock and Laschever, 2003) . These behaviors may in turn influence relative outcomes across the two groups. For example, fairness concerns affect the response to wage offers, perhaps causing one group to "overreject" very low wage offers. Such concerns may also influence the types of social redistribution programs that a group supports. If these programs are important for the outcomes listed above, then their provision and structure may contribute to the observed outcome gaps. Finally, UG behavior has been examined in a variety of cultural settings and groups which provides useful benchmarks for our own results. In particular, Eckel and Grossman (1998) note in a footnote that large differences were detected in how students at a predominantly black college played the UG compared to the students from a predominantly white college.
We conduct a survey experiment in which respondents are invited to play the UG by telephone. 4 Participants are selected from the universe of registered voters in three states with large 3 See Roth (1995) and Camerer (2003) for recent reviews of the literature. For a meta-analysis of 75 UG experiments in 37 studies see Oosterbeek, Sloof, and Kuilen (2004) .
black populations. The states we employ all record registrant race in the voter file, which also contains the registrant's home address and phone number. Using the address data, we merge the voter file information with neighborhood level (Census block group) characteristics from the 2000 U.S. Census. We then draw a random sample stratified on race, block-level median income, and neighborhood racial diversity from the merged data. Balancing our sample on these dimensions allows us to compare the game behavior of whites and African Americans, as well as to make comparisons along other socio-economic lines. Our final sample contains 1650 respondents.
In our study, all participants play the role of respondent. We focus on the Responder's decision to accept or reject the offer due to our interest in fairness preferences and inequality aversion in particular. 5 Respondents are told that they have been selected to play a game with a proposer (who is hypothetical) who has made an offer to divide a given stakes amount. The stakes to be divided, the amount of the offer, and the name of the "Proposer" are all randomly assigned to respondents. We use commonly-occurring but racially distinct names among white and African American males to imply the race of the Proposer.
We find that African Americans and whites have similar levels of aversion to unequal treatment defined as the share that a hypothetical UG proposer allocates to the respondents in our study. Two differences in the groups are apparent, however. First, African Americans but not whites are more likely to accept larger offers, even after controlling for the share of the total sum being offered. This difference is confined to those with low incomes, however. Second, the implied race of the proposer matters. African Americans facing proposers who are implied to be African
American increase their acceptance rates to higher offered shares more rapidly than do African
Americans facing proposers who are implied to be white. 4 Others have studied inequality aversion using survey data (Atkinson 1970) . 5 Non-trivial offers by the first player have been attributed either to strategic or altruistic behavior (Kravitz and Gunto 1992) . Altruism is somewhat different from fairness, and we believe the behavior of the second player more directly reflects fairness preferences. (cite)
Our paper makes three main contributions. First, we add an important new dimension to the literature on group differences in economic decision-making. We provide the first analysis of racial differences in fairness preferences in a representative U.S. population. Over the last decade economists have used laboratory experiments to uncover striking and potentially important differences across groups in how they behave in a variety of experimental settings. Differences along lines of gender and ethnicity (or nationality) in particular have received considerable attention. However, the study of racial differences in economic decision-making has so far been quite limited.
Two important exceptions are Benjamin, Choi and Strickland (2009) , who examine the effects of race priming on subjects' expressed preferences for risk aversion in a university-based sample, and Fong and Luttmer (2009) who use a representative sample to analyze racial differences in charitable giving.
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Our second contribution is the introduction of a new (to economics) technique for obtaining representative samples of experimental subjects-the use of voter file demographic and contact information combined with Census block group data on neighborhood characteristics. Our approach has several advantages over others in the literature. First, we are able to construct a data set that is much more representative of the wider population than is typically found in experimental studies. Studies of social preferences (albeit not the UG) that have compared the behavior of students and non-students have identified significant differences between the groups (Gordon, Slade, and Schmidt 1986; Fehr and List 2004; Carpenter, Connolly, and Myers 2008) . As one study put it, "problems exist in replicating with nonstudent subjects behavioral phenomena observed in student samples" (Gordon et al., 1986) . Second, respondents to our survey did not volunteer in response to an advertisement for experiment participants, a form of sample self-selection that can also detract from respresentativeness (Doty and Silverthorne, 1975) . Finally, our approach allows us to collect detailed information on a respondent's neighborhood, something that is typically missing from databases of voluntary, non-student participants and which cannot be reliably collected in a survey format. 8 The neighborhood level information also allows us to balance our sample according to the types of environments respondents live in, something that is not possible with other data sets.
If neighborhoods are important determinants or correlates of preferences, then this type of neighborhood-level information can provide both a crucial set of controls and a useful dimension for sampling.
Our final contribution in this paper is to expand the ultimatum game setting to allow us to consider different notions of fairness. Inequality aversion is the notion of fairness that says the proposer should split his windfall more or less equally and that conversely responders should reject unequal splits. Alternatively, respondents may have a minimum acceptable offer size below which they will reject, like a reservation wage. Our experiment varies offer size and stakes randomly across players, so we can determine whether increasing offer amounts or increasing equality in the proposed play separate roles in the acceptance decision. Our finding that the absolute size of the offer matters independently of the share of the split in some cases suggests that studies of inequality aversion where the stakes are kept constant may miss an important dimension of ultimatum game behavior.
8 Examples of these databases include KnowledgeNetworks and TESS.
II. Sample
Experimental games frequently take place in laboratories and rely on undergraduate subject populations. 9 Undergraduate samples pose a particular problem for studying racial differences in inequality aversion because blacks are underrepresented in college populations. College samples also draw from a higher stratum of the socio-economic spectrum where individuals may experience inequality differently from older and less educated persons. Volunteer samples from the wider population suffer from similar problems. As Doty and Silverthorne (1975) note, volunteers in human research "typically have more education, higher occupational status, earlier birth position, lower chronological age, higher need for approval and lower authoritarianism than non-volunteers"
To address these concerns, we sought to randomly sample a broad a spectrum of subjects from the general population.
We use a sampling frame new to the economics literature: voter registration files. Sampling registered voters has been found to be slightly superior to random-digit dialing with 9 See Levitt and List (2009) for a discussion of issues related to typical experimental samples. 10 The median categories for education and family income are the same for registered and unregistered persons, but registered persons are slightly wealthier and better educated.
regards to predicting election forecasting (Green and Gerber 2006 we geocoded the observations and appended data on Census block group characteristics. Thus, the data used in this experiment come from the voter file, census block group data, and answers provided during the experiment itself.
Our use of Census block group information makes our sampling approach different from that of using a representative population sample from a maintained database. It allows us to sample respondents based on their neighborhood characteristics. This in turn allows us to stratify our sampling to achieve sample balance along several important dimensions. This feature of our sampling approach is an important contribution of our study. Neighborhood level information is not part of the basic demographic variables collected in maintained databases. Indeed, detailed geographic information is relatively uncommon in microdata. It is also unlikely that survey respondents can be relied upon to provide this information themselves, since individuals are highly unlikely to know such information as their Census block group's median household income.
Behavior in ultimatum games and reactions to being treated unequally in general are potentially conditioned by income. Given persistent differences in income between blacks and whites, it is important to keep the income of the participants in the experiment as consistent as possible. 13 Thus, our first strata dimension is Census block group median income. To balance income across blacks and whites while providing variance in income, black and white subjects were drawn only from census block groups falling within the following three bands of income based on median household income among blacks for each state: a) 10 th percentile to 10 th percentile plus $2,000; b) the median plus or minus $1,000; and c) $2,000 below the 90 th percentile to the 90 th percentile. For example, whites and blacks sampled in South Carolina resided in census block groups with median household incomes between $21 -23,000, $30 -32,000, and $48 -50,000.
Despite economic segregation in housing and the Census Bureau's efforts to draw boundaries to account for well-defined neighborhoods and increased homogeneity, there will be variance in income within neighborhoods so individual respondents may not have identical incomes. However, 13 In 2008, the median household income for non-Hispanic whites was $55,530 compared to $34,218 for non-Hispanic blacks (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2009).
we can be certain that blacks and whites were selected from neighborhoods with similar average socio-economic statuses.
The racial diversity of a subject's neighborhood may also moderate her response to the treatment stimulus, so blocking on the racial diversity of a neighborhood is also essential. The racial mix of each neighborhood was determined by looking at the percentage of registered voters in each precinct falling into the major racial categories. Drawing loosely on the neighborhood tipping point literature (Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2008) , we then categorized neighborhoods as being relatively homogeneous (0-20% and 80-100% black), predominantly white (20-40% black), evenly balanced (40-60% black), or predominantly black (60-80% black). The goal of the categories was to keep the neighborhood context as constant as possible across black and white respondents.
The subject pool was then stratified based on state of residence, the race of the subject (white or black), the three income categories (low, middle, and high for blacks in the state), and the levels of neighborhood diversity (homogeneous, predominantly white, evenly divided, and predominantly black). That is, there are 24 strata in each state in the experiment. Subjects within each strata were then randomly assigned to the three facets of the treatment.
The targeted sample was not strictly representative of the entire population in order to focus on racial differences in inequality aversion. Within the three income strata for neighborhoods (10 th percentile, median, 90 th percentile), targeted subjects were randomly selected among registered black and white voters in each of the three states. The result is a sample that differs substantially from typical undergraduate populations. Not only is the sample racially diverse, but also considerably older (see Table 1 , top panel). The subjects also come from much more diverse neighborhoods socio-economically, as the levels of education (17% college degree and a median of 11.7 years of education) and income (median household income $35,500 with 16% poverty) suggest (see Table 1 , middle panel). Most importantly for our purposes, the blacks and whites drawn for the experiment are comparable in nearly every measurable capacity. The only statistically significant difference between the black and white samples is in the percentage of blacks and whites in the neighborhood -a difference due entirely to the selection of racially homogeneous (predominantly white and black)
neighborhoods.
The sample drawn may differ from the participants in the actual experiment. The experimental calls took place between December 10, 2008 and January 26, 2009. The survey firm attempted to dial 5397 valid telephone numbers attempted and completed experiments with 1650 subjects for a total response rate of 31%. Of those subjects who answered the phone, the refusal rate was only 19% (i.e., 81% of the people took the survey once on the phone). These contact rates are very good compared to other public opinion surveys and yielded a broad cross section of the populace.
As expected, the people contacted by the survey firm differed from the broader subject pool (see Table 2 , panel A). People answering the phone were more likely to be white, female, and older, and live in neighborhoods with less income and education. That said, the actual differences between the ideal sample and the people contacted are not huge (e.g., 2 percentage point difference in gender, $2000 in income). Since treatment conditions were randomly assigned, the offers, stakes, and names to be offered subjects did not differ between contacted and uncontacted individuals.
Once a subject was contacted, there were very few differences between the people participating in the experiment and those refusing to participate (see Table 2 , panel B). Compliers and non-compliers were similar with regards to race, age, education, and income. The only statistically significant difference between compliers and non-compliers was that women were more likely to participate in the experiment. Thus, the population of subjects participating in the experiment is fairly representative of black and white registered voters in the three states for the three income categories selected. It is always possible that people who could not be reached or did not agree to participate would respond to the treatment differently, but it is safe to say that the experimental population is as representative as possible of the intended population.
III. Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of calling subjects on the telephone and asking inviting to play an ultimatum game. The rules were explained and the name and home city of the proposer was described to the subject. The offer was presented to the subject, who could then accept or reject the offer. The subject was then asked what the smallest acceptable offer to the subject would have been. The call ended by confirming the contact information of the subject.
Several concerns led us to use a fictitious rather than real proposer in the ultimatum game.
For one, organic offers generated by subjects in ultimatum games tend to exhibit relatively low variance and cluster just under a 50/50 split (cite. Such a distribution is not optimal from the standpoint of studying inequality aversion. By directly manipulating the offers presented to responders, we can guarantee variance in the variables of interest. Also, creating a fictitious opponent with no actual interaction with the subject allows for complete consistency across subjects and avoids heterogeneous treatments. trained regarding the rules of the game and the nature of the research. 15 The script used during the course of calling is included in Appendix A. 16 The script asks the subject if she would like to play a game for research purposes, describes the financial incentives, explains the rules of the game, introduces the fictitious proposer, informs her of the offer, and records whether she accepts or rejects the "proposed" offer. The caller then asks the subject for her minimally acceptable offer and verifies the subject's contact information. A debriefing letter describing the purpose of the study and the nature of the deception was mailed to participating subjects the day after the call took place, along with any winnings from accepting an offer.
The call script provided two distinct treatments. First, the stakes of the ultimatum game played and the offer made by the opponent were both varied. Most prior work on inequality aversion keeps the stakes of the game constant and varies the offers, assuming that the absolute differences in the stakes will not materially affect a subject's utility so inequality aversion must be driving the results. Our goal was to randomly vary the stakes of the game from which particular offers were made to directly manipulate the inequality of the offer. For instance, an offer of $2 could be made in a $5, $10, $10, $50, or $100 game. To ensure that the results were not idiosyncratic to the amount of the offer, several different dollar values of offers were tested ($1, $2, $5, and $10). The frequency distribution of the offer and stake combinations used in the game is presented in Appendix 2. This distribution concentrated subjects into offer/stakes cells where high variance in acceptance rates was anticipated and away from cells where it was anticipated that acceptance rates would be very low or high. Since subjects in each stratum were randomly assigned to each cell, the different probabilities of receiving a particular offer or stakes does not bias the results in the slightest because subjects were equally likely to be assigned to each of the conditions.
The second treatment involved the implied race of the opponent. As explained above, to the extent that inequality aversion is directly related to income differences between the races the probability of accepting a given offer may depend on the race of the proposer. In the laboratory, race can be manipulated by purposefully pairing subjects or using confederates. This visual manipulation is not possible in a telephone-based study, so we instead rely on racially polarized names. See Appendix 3 for details of the name construction. After agreeing to play the game, the subject is told the full name of the fictitious proposer and then the first name is repeated four more times over the course of the script (see Appendix 1). During the final statement of the name, the amount each player will receive from the proposed split is explicitly stated after their name in order to make the connection between the name and the inequality of the split very direct. To the extent that the names are unambiguously associated with a particular race, we can manipulate a subject's perception of the opponent's race.
IV. Results

A. Randomization Checks
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is important to verify that the treatments (names, stakes, and offers) were balanced across subjects-in other words, that our randomization worked. We verify this in Table 3 . We present the estimated mean and standard error of each treatment variable by the 24 strata defined by income, race, and neighborhood diversity. Looking down the columns of means, there is a high degree of consistency in a treatment variable's mean across strata groups.
Importantly, the within-stratum mean is typically within one standard error of the total sample mean and in all cases within two. No systematic differences are observed for any of the treatments. We conclude that the randomization procedure worked, and therefore differences in acceptance rates can be attributed to the treatments rather than characteristics of the subjects. However, for completeness we present results with controls for the strata or for observable characteristics.
B. Graphical analysis
We begin by presenting a graphical version of our basic analysis in Figures 1a-f . The figures show acceptance rates conditional on respondent race and offer size both for the experiment overall and separately by assigned stakes size. The shaded areas cover 95% confidence intervals around the mean acceptance rates. Figure 1a shows acceptance rates by race and offer averaged over all stakes levels.
Acceptance rates are non-trivial but less than one at all offer levels in our experiment. This is reassuring, since it suggests that our stakes-offer combinations span a range over which there is potential for changes in stakes or offer size to lead to changes in respondent behavior. Figure 1a also shows that whites are somewhat more likely than blacks to accept small offers (although the difference is not significant). This relationship is reversed for larger offers (and the difference becomes significant). We seek to better understand this reversal below and in our conclusion. For now, we simply point out that this reversal implies neither race is likely to have a general propensity toward higher acceptance rates. We demonstrate this more formally in our probit analysis.
Figures 1b through 1f show disaggregated acceptance rates across the five stakes levels in our experiment. Within these sub-experiments, consistent with prior studies acceptance rates generally rise with offer size, and again are non-trivial but less than one. 17 In instances where respondents are offered an even split, roughly 50% accept. This is true across all three stakes levels (5, 10, and 20) in which this split was offered. The figures also show that the black-white reversal in relative acceptance rates generally occurs between $2 and $5 offers, regardless of stakes size.
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In Figure 2a , we plot acceptance rates by race over the share that the proposed split represents. Figures 2b through 2e plot these separately by offer amount, allowing us to observe for a given offer, how varying the stakes affects the acceptance rate. It is clear from the figures that acceptance rates increase with share for both races. At higher offers -$5 and $10 -this increase is monotonic and blacks have uniformly higher acceptance rates than whites. For small offers, blacks and whites exhibit similar acceptance rates but there is some non-monotonicity in responses to these offers when they represent very small shares. These figures foreshadow another of our results, namely that blacks and whites differ in their responses to offer size, conditional on the share that the offer represents.
C. Estimation i. Analysis of Baseline Models
We use probit analysis to investigate the determinants of acceptance more formally. We begin by estimating baseline models on our complete sample of respondents. Specifically, we estimate the following two probit models, where the individual subscript i on all variables has been suppressed:
The $50 stakes sub-experiment is the only exception to this.
Black is an indicator variable for whether the respondent indicated that s/he is African American on their voter registration form. 19 Recall that we obtain this information from the voter file data, rather than from the respondent directly, so the respondent's race is not being explicitly cued by the experiment. Accept is an indicator for whether the respondent accepted the ultimatum split of stakes as given in offer. Share equals offer divided by stakes.
The share identity introduces some subtlety into the analysis. An artifact of the construction of share is that offer can be interpreted as the interaction of stakes*share. This makes interpreting the coefficient on offer in model (1b) somewhat awkward, since it gives the change in acceptance probability for a one unit increase in stakes*share holding stakes and share individually constant. Since model (1a) includes only offer and share from among the assigned game variables, no game variable in this specification is equivalent to an interaction with any other two variables. The coefficients on offer and share estimated by (1a) are cumulative of effects due to their covariance with share, but their interpretation is more transparent. We then show that these effects are robust to controlling for stakes by estimating (1b). Omitting stakes is not the only way to handle this problem. However, theory and previous experimental work predict an important role for share, and Figures 1a-f suggest racial differences in the response to offer. In order of interest then, stakes seems the natural candidate for exclusion.
We estimate versions of the (1a) and (1b) specifications that exclude interactions of the assigned game variables with black. By omitting the race interactions, we can more formally assess whether blacks are more or less likely to accept an ultimatum offer on average across our games. We 19 Racial coding was also confirmed by data collected by the consumer data firm where available. Unsurprisingly, people who check "Black" on voter registration forms are also likely to select "Black" in other outlets.
also document the average effects of changes in our game variables on acceptance decisions. We then use (1a) and (1b) to address questions about whether blacks and whites respond differently to changes in specific ultimatum game variables.
The vector Γ contains additional control variables. We estimate specifications with four different version of Γ. In the first of these, Γ is empty. In principle, our randomization strategy should balance respondents on observed and unobserved characteristics, so no additional covariates need be included for consistent estimation of the γ and β parameters in (1a) and (1b), respectively.
Nevertheless, we verify that the estimates obtained from the "no controls" specifications are robust to the inclusion of controls for observed characteristics. Our second specification adds controls for a respondent's Census block group characteristics. These are listed in Table 1 . Their inclusion will control for differences across our strata in tract-level aggregate characteristics other than median household income and racial diversity. 20 A third specification adds controls for "game conditions," which includes the length of the interview in minutes, the time of the interview (which embeds the date and is not listed in the table), and the number of times the survey firm tried the respondent's telephone number. If for some reason respondents across race-income-neighborhood racial diversity strata differ in the times they were called or their interaction with the survey firm in a way that affects their responses, these variables should account for that. 21 In our fourth specification, we estimate a specification with a full set of fixed effects for our 24 strata. This flexibly captures any differences in game responses that occur systematically across strata.
The results of estimating these 16 specifications are presented in Table 4 . Panels A and B present estimates from the permutations of models (1a) and (1b), respectively. The sample is not 20 See McClellan and Skinner (1999) and Geronimus et al. (1996) for an example and discussion of using neighborhood level aggregates to proxy for individual characteristics. 21 Some of the data appended by the survey firm, like time of interview, is missing for respondents who did not progress sufficiently far in the interview. Some of these respondents did manage to answer the ultimatum game question, so they are part of our sample.
stable across the four specifications of the control vector Γ, as shown in the bottom rows of the panels. A large number of respondents are missing data for the game conditions variables and, to a lesser extent, for the tract level demographic controls. These respondents are therefore dropped from the estimation when these variables are included in Γ. For this reason, our preferred specification is that in which Γ consists of the strata fixed effects. The strata fixed effects specification includes all respondents yet controls for group differences across our race-incomeneighborhood diversity cells. Results from this specification are presented in bold in Table 4 .
There is a high degree of consistency across results from the eight specifications in Panel A.
Black is an insignificant predictor of acceptance, save for one instance of marginal significance. In all specifications, share has a large, strongly significant and positive impact on acceptance. The implied marginal effect of a 10 percentage point increase in share is an increase in the likelihood of acceptance of a little more than four percentage points. Moreover, the coefficient on share is unaffected by the addition of the share*black interaction term. This means that blacks and whites respond similarly to changes in the share that a proposed offer represents, holding offer size constant. We interpret this as evidence that blacks and whites have similar levels of aversion to inequality on average.
Changes in offer size, however, tell a different story. The estimated impact of offer is positive, and marginally significant in two cases (although not in our preferred specification) when the interactions with race are excluded. Once race interactions are included, the sign on offer changes (in three of the four control specifications). This is because blacks and whites differ significantly in their response to changes in the offer amount, holding share constant. Estimates in the last four columns of Panel A show that an extra dollar in the offer increases the likelihood of a black respondent accepting by nearly two percentage points, an effect that is roughly half that of a ten percentage point increase in share.
These results are robust to the inclusion of the stakes variables in Panel B. If anything, the patterns identified in Panel A are stronger and more consistent in Panel B. This is because coefficients on offer and share no longer reflect the combined effects of those variables and stakes.
Black is now uniformly insignificant. Offer has a positive sign when the race interactions are excluded and a negative sign when they are included but is insignificant in all cases. The impact of share is even more strongly positive than in Panel A. The offer effect identified for blacks in Panel A is larger in the Panel B estimates, suggesting that an extra dollar in the offer increases the relative probability that a black respondent accepts by 2.5 percentage points. Again there is no significant difference between blacks and whites in the effect of share. Stakes does not significantly predict acceptance, although it consistently has a positive but small point estimate. In specifications with the race interactions, black*stakes has a similarly sized negative point estimate.
ii. Understanding the Offer Effect
We know of no previous research that identifies an independent effect of offer size on acceptance behavior in the ultimatum game, so we are unable to compare this feature of our results to the work of others. In this section, we investigate the robustness of this finding in order to better understand it. One possible source of this result is that respondents may not have had a good understanding of the game. If blacks overlooked or misunderstood the fairness aspects of the game more frequently than whites, then we might observe an independent effect of offer size for blacks but not for whites.
We can investigate this possibility using answers to Question 3 (Q3) of our survey. Q3 asked respondents to name the smallest offer that they would have found acceptable. As Table 1 documented, nearly 40% of respondents who answered Q3 gave an answer that was incompatible with their behavior in the ultimatum game. We separate our sample, conditional on answering Q3, into those who gave responses consistent with their behavior and those whose response was inconsistent. 22 We then re-estimate our preferred specifications from Table 4 on these subsamples.
It is important to note that we consider the compatibility of Q3 to be only a suggestive proxy for understanding the game. It is possible that respondents who answered Q3 inconsistently nevertheless understood and answered Q2 in a valid way. Nevertheless, we believe that the large number of incompatible responses justifies investigating whether the offer effect is driven by this particular subgroup.
The results are presented in Table 5 . Two important points emerge from this analysis. First, respondents who gave inconsistent answers to Q3 exhibit a response to changes in share that is wrong-signed and sometimes significant. Given that their response to increases in share differs so dramatically from that of respondents who have consistent answers, we surmise that an inconsistent response to Q3 strongly suggests that the respondent did not understand the game. 23 Second, the offer effect identified for blacks in Table 4 is not driven by individuals with poor game comprehension. If anything, the opposite appears to be true. This is shown in the last two columns in Panel B of Table 5 . This model includes all three game variables and their interactions with black.
Blacks who gave consistent responses to Q3 exhibit a larger, statistically significant response to increases in offer size than do whites with a point estimate that exceeds the Table 4 estimate, while blacks and whites who gave inconsistent responses are insignificantly affected by offer.
Interestingly, a probit analysis of the determinants of a valid Q3 response turned up no significant predictors. 24 Although it is somewhat puzzling that variables like neighborhood income 22 Specifically, a consistent answer was defined as a minimum amount less than or equal to an accepted offer OR a minimum amount greater than a rejected offer. Inconsistent responses gave minimum amounts less than or equal to a rejected offer OR greater than an accepted offer. 23 The implied marginal effect of share is greater than 1 for respondents who gave consistent answers. This simply indicates that the slope of share is steeper than one over the range observed in the data. 24 A probit model predicting inconsistent Q3 responses included the following as possible determinants: black dummy, female dummy, household size, age and age squared, state indicators, indicators for neighborhood diversity categories, median household income, and mean years of education at the Census tract level.
and education level do not predict game comprehension, there are reasons why this might be the case. Perhaps game comprehension requires catching respondents at a moment when they can briefly pay attention to the caller. If the likelihood of getting a respondent at a "good time" is unrelated to respondent characteristics -i.e. it is just surveyor luck-then again we would find no significant predictors of Q3 response.
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While we cannot know the exact reason for poor game comprehension in our experiment, it is helpful for our analysis that comprehension is unrelated to observable respondent characteristics.
Given this orthogonality, we continue our analysis using the complete sample of Q2 respondents and retaining the experimental data in the form in which it was collected, rather than dropping those who appear not to have understood the game. We assume this is a conservative strategy. Because game understanding is unrelated to observable characteristics, and in particular to race, poor game comprehension on the part of a large number of respondents likely attenuates our reported results.
To further investigate the source of the offer effect for blacks, we re-estimated our baseline models on subsets of the data defined by demographic characteristics, to see if the offer effect might be stronger in some groups than others. The results of interest from this exercise are presented in Table 6 .
26 Table 6 shows the results of estimating our models separately on subsamples defined by income (the same three income categories used to define our sample strata). Note that we omit strata fixed effects from the models in Table 6 because (i) their inclusion does not substantively impact the results but does increase imprecision, and (ii) the relevant strata are not constant across 25 In principle it is possible that there was a subset of interviewers at the survey firm who were difficult for respondents to understand. In this case, random allocation of phone numbers to surveyors would mean that respondent demographics are orthogonal to game comprehension. Based on our observation of the callers, we consider this possibility unlikely. 26 We performed the same exercise using subsamples defined by neighborhood racial diversity. The offer effect was again limited to blacks and was similar in size across all subsamples (and therefore similar in size to the estimates in Table 4 ). We found no differences of note in the other parameter estimates.
income categories, meaning that the estimating equation would necessarily change across subsamples.
Panel A reports estimates from the full game variable specification. We first report estimates from the model without race interactions, primarily for comparison. The results of interest are in the final three columns of Panel A. These estimates show that the effects of both offer and share on acceptance differ across income groups. The main effect of share is largest for the lowest income group, and is significantly larger (at the 10% level) than the coefficient on share for the highest income group. The negative point estimates on black*share in the lowest and middle income groups provides some evidence that lower and middle-income blacks are relatively less influenced by share in their acceptance decisions.
Although the main effect of share is insignificant for the highest income group, this is a result of retaining respondents with poor game comprehension. When the "inconsistent" group defined in Table 5 is excluded, the patterns in Panel A of Table 6 are retained but the coefficients increase in magnitude and gain significance in some cases, consistent with the attenuation bias that error-prone data would introduce. In particular, the lowest income blacks in this exercise were significantly less influenced by share than whites in that group. In the highest income group, the main effect of share was positive and significant, and did not differ significantly across races.
Returning to the results in Table 6 , the main effect of offer in the lowest income group is negative and significant, but blacks in this group are significantly more likely than whites to accept after a dollar is added to offer. The net offer effect for blacks is roughly 2.5 and is significant at the 5% level -exactly the same result we reported for the complete sample in Table 4 . The main effect and black*offer are both insignificant in estimates using the two higher income groups.
The negative and significant main effect of offer in the lowest income group is counterintuitive since, conditional on share, we would expect higher offers to be more likely to be accepted. It is reasonable to worry that the inter-relationship between the three game variables is contributing to this. To assess this possibility, we present versions of the model with either stakes or share omitted in Panel B. The main effect of offer is either insignificant or positive across all income groups in these models. Black*offer is still large and positive for the lowest income group, and the pattern of results for share is also retained in the first three columns in Panel B. Results in Panel B
were qualitatively the same when we omitted respondents with poor game comprehension from the estimation. In light of the Panel B results, it seems likely that the negative sign on offer size among whites in the lowest income group in Panel A is explained by the fact that offer is an interaction of stakes and share.
We conclude that the offer effect for blacks identified in Table 4 is driven by blacks in the lowest income group. Moreover, blacks and whites in the lowest part of the black income distribution respond differently to the share and offer variables, with offer size having relatively more influence on blacks' acceptance decisions and share having more influence for whites. Interestingly, lower income whites and blacks both differ from their higher income racial counterparts, but they do so in different ways. For those in the highest income group, share is less important than it is for low income whites and offer is less important than it is for low income blacks.
iii. The Effect of Proposer Race
The final dimension to our experiment was the random assignment of the implied race of our hypothetical ultimatum proposer. As described in the data section, this was done through the use of racially distinct male names. 27 Tables 7 and 8 explore variation in acceptance rates across proposer-respondent race combinations. Table 7 presents raw acceptance rates for the four 27 Note that callers for the survey firm were predominantly white. While this is probably helpful from the standpoint of preventing additional variation in the treatment, it is possible that the race of the caller is more salient than the implied race of the proposer. As a result, our variation on this dimension may suffer from reduced impact.
proposer-respondent race cells, and acceptance rates across the cells are all very close to the sample average. This is reflected in Table 8 , which presents results from a probit model of the respondent's acceptance decision with controls for the four mutually exclusive race combinations. White respondent-white proposer is the omitted category. There is evidence that blacks facing a black proposer are more likely to accept than respondents in the other three scenarios. This is consistent with this cell having the highest observed acceptance rate in Table 7 .
We explore the effect of proposer race further by adding interactions with proposer race to the offer-share model discussed above. We use the offer-share model, rather than the full game variable model, because (i) the previous analysis showed that adding stakes to the model had little impact on coefficients obtained from the offer-share model, and (ii) the interactions with proposer race place additional strain on the data, so we try to eliminate unnecessary covariates from the model. We create a dummy variable equal to one if the name of the hypothetical proposer was a high frequency black name. 28 As before, we present results from specifications both with and without respondent race interactions with the randomly assigned variables.
The results are presented in Table 9 . A number of findings from previous specifications carry over to the proposer race models. There is no average difference in acceptance rates across blacks and whites; share is the most important predictor of acceptance; and the offer effect for blacks is largely robust to the new specifications. With the caveat in mind that we may be asking a lot of the data to estimate these models -particularly the one which includes race interactions -the results in Table 9 reveal some interesting points about proposer race. First, the main effect of proposer race is insignificant. This means that, at least as we have conveyed it through our experiment, proposer race has no impact on overall acceptance rates. Proposer race also does not significantly alter the effects of the game variables offer and share, or of respondent race. Finally, the fact that proposer race * black is small and insignificant appears at odds with the results in Table 8 . However, the model with race interactions shows that blacks respond more strongly to increases in share when the proposer is black. This likely explains why blacks facing black proposers exhibit somewhat higher acceptance rates in the more parsimonious model of Table 8 . This turns out to be something more subtle than a level effect of black proposers when the respondent is black. Rather, blacks facing black proposers increase their acceptance rates more rapidly in response to higher offered shares than do blacks facing white proposers.
V. Conclusion
Using a real world sample, and controlling for neighborhood characteristics, we find that there is racial homogeneity in inequality aversion as measured by responses in the ultimatum game.
Blacks are not generally more or less likely than whites to reject a given share of the stakes, and neither group rejects more often on average. However, we find that blacks are more likely to accept larger offers conditional on share, and that this is driven difference in the behavior of blacks and whites in the lowest income category. We also find some effect of implied proposer race. Blacks increase their acceptance of increasing offered share more rapidly when the perceived race of the Proposer is black.
Our finding that black acceptance of offers is more responsive to shares offered by implied blacks than whites relates to prior work on discrimination (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001) . That is, the behavior we observe is consistent with blacks being more sensitive to being treated unfairly by whites than by blacks.
At this point we can only speculate about the source of the offer effect among poorer blacks. One possible explanation relates to concerns about status. Prior work has shown that individuals will attempt to distinguish themselves from groups to which they belong demographically if the reference group is of low status. For instance, Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (forthcoming) show that blacks and Hispanics spend more than whites on conspicuous goods conditional on income. They argue that this behavior stems from concerns about reference group status. In our study, poorer blacks showed a tendency to reject small offers ($1 or $2) regardless of the stakes; this tendency might be attributed to the stigma associated with welfare (Gilens 1999) .
When larger sums are offered, very low income blacks tend more than whites to accept the offer, perhaps because the value of the offer has exceeded the stigma associated with accepting it.
However, there are at least two alternative explanations for the offer effect among blacks.
One possibility is that "gifts" might be associated with stronger expectations of future reciprocity among low income blacks as compared to low income whites. This could make accepting small gifts relatively less desirable. Like the stigma explanation, this explanation assumes that utility maximizing behavior in response to social concerns drives racial differences in ultimatum game behavior. A final possibility is that different underlying preferences drive racial differences in behavior. In our case, blacks and whites are both more likely to accept offers that represent larger shares of the stakes, suggesting a common preference for more equal splits, but blacks are more likely to impose a nominal lower bar below which any share of a split is unacceptable. While it is theoretically possible that a "reservation" offer level is part of preferences for blacks more often than for whites, the fact that only low income blacks respond to the game in this way suggests to us that social and status concerns are more likely explanations for the differences we observe. While more work is needed to distinguish these two sets of explanations, we believe our findings nevertheless underscore the usefulness of obtaining not just representative samples, but samples in which meaningful comparisons can be made across different socio-economic groups. Notes: Contact defined as having day of interview recorded by survey firm. Participation defined as answering accept/reject ultimatum offer (Q2). * indicates different from the mean in the contacted (participated) subsample at the 5% level. Notes: Q2 is the respondent's choice of whether to accept or reject the ultimatum offer. Q3 is the respondent's statement about the minimum amount s/he would have accepted. Roughly 40% of respondents who answered Q3 give minimum amounts inconsistent with their choices in Q2. All specifications contain a full set of strata fixed effects. 36 respondents did not answer Q3. is indicator for acceptance of proposed split. All equations estimated via probit; implied marginal effects reported. Models include only listed covariates. Absolute value of robust z statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Strata Fixed Effects Yes No
Observations 1650 1650 Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for acceptance of proposed split. All equations estimated via probit; implied marginal effects reported and robust z-statistics in parentheses. White-White is the omitted category. P-value of F-test that the three reported coefficients are jointly different from zero is 0.33 in fixed effects column; 0.24 in no fixed effects column. * significant at 5%. names. Thus, we have four possible combinations of names for each race.
30
To give the treatment a little more detail and seem more real, we said the fictitious opponent lived in the state's biggest city. 31 To ensure that subjects were unlikely to know anyone with our created names, we check that no one shared those names in those cities. Across the three states, only six people shared any of the treatment names. Thus, subjects should have viewed the names as believable but would not know anyone sharing the same name.
Subjects of both races were randomly assigned to have a black or white opponent. One of the four created names was then randomly assigned for each race. Thus, each subject was equally likely to have one of the eight possibilities named as an opponent. Multiple names were created for each race to minimize the risk that the results of the experiment were dependent on a particular name.
None of the results from any analysis conducted depends on the particular racialized name presented, so the analysis presented in the paper will only pay attention to the race of the opponent provided rather than the particular name used.
30 White: Scott Walsh; Scott Snyder; Dustin Walsh; Dustin Snyder. Black: Cedric Washington; Cedric Booker; Andre Washington; Andre Booker. 31 Charlotte, North Carolina; Atlanta, Georgia; and, Columbia, South Carolina.
